We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model where …rm value is endogenous to trading, due to feedback from the …nancial market to corporate decisions. Trading reveals private information to managers and improves their real decisions, enhancing fundamental value. This feedback e¤ect has an asymmetric e¤ect on trading behavior as it increases (reduces) the pro…tability of buying (selling) on good (bad) news. This gives rise to an endogenous limit to arbitrage, whereby investors may refrain from trading on negative information. Thus, bad news is incorporated more slowly into prices than good news, potentially leading to overinvestment.
Introduction
One of the basic tenets of …nancial economics is the informativeness of market prices. The basic argument is that pro…t opportunities in the …nancial market will lead speculators to trade in a way that eliminates any mispricing. Such trading leads to their information being incorporated into prices. For example, if speculators have negative private information about a stock, they will …nd it pro…table to sell the stock. This action will push down the price, re ‡ecting the speculators'information.
A key reason why price informativeness is deemed to be important is that prices can a¤ect real decisions -the feedback e¤ect. Indeed, if prices are informative, it is natural to expect that real decision makers, such as managers, directors, and activist investors, will use the information in prices to guide decisions that a¤ect …rm value (such as investment). In this paper, we show that, if real decision makers take advantage of price informativeness by learning from prices, this a¤ects speculators'incentives to trade on information and thus changes price informativeness in the …rst place.
The basic idea is as follows. If real decision makers use the information in the price to make more informed decisions, they will increase the value of the underlying asset. This increased asset value increases speculators' incentive to buy on positive information and reduces their incentive to sell on negative information, thus changing price informativeness in an asymmetric way. In particular, bad news is less likely to be incorporated into prices and a¤ect real decisions.
To …x ideas, consider the following example. Suppose that a large speculator has conducted analysis suggesting that a …rm has poor investment opportunities. Traditional theory suggests that she should sell the …rm's stock. However, large-scale selling will push down the price and convey to the …rm that its investment opportunities are poor. As a result, the …rm may disinvest, boosting its value by avoiding over-investment. This reduces the speculator's pro…t from selling and in some cases causes her to su¤er a loss. Taking this e¤ect into account, the speculator may decide to trade less on her information, and so it is less re ‡ected in the price. Therefore, the market is not strong-form e¢ cient in the Fama (1970) sense, in that private information is not re ‡ected in the price. However, it is strong-form e¢ cient in the Jensen (1978) sense, in that a privately-informed investor cannot earn pro…ts by trading on her information.
A classic example of how information from the stock market can shape real decisions is Coca-Cola's attempted acquisition of Quaker Oats. On November 20, 2000, the Wall Street Journal reported that Coca-Cola was in talks to acquire Quaker Oats. Shortly thereafter, CocaCola con…rmed such discussions. The market reacted negatively, sending Coca-Cola's shares down 8% on November 20 and 2% on November 21. Coca-Cola's board rejected the acquisition later on November 21, potentially due to the negative market reaction. The following day, Coca-Cola's shares rebounded 8%. Thus, speculators who had short-sold on the initial merger announcement, based on the belief that the acquisition would destroy value, lost money -precisely the e¤ect modeled by this paper. 1 In Section 3.5, we discuss another similar example involving Hewlett Packard's (HP) acquisition of Compaq. Our mechanism is based on the presence of a feedback e¤ect from the …nancial market to real economic decisions -decision makers learn from the market when deciding their actions. A common perception is that managers know more about their own …rms than outsiders (e.g. Myers and Majluf (1984) ). While this perception is plausible for internal information about the …rm in isolation, optimal decisions also depend on external information (such as market demand for a …rm's products, the future prospects of the industry, or potential synergies with a target) which outsiders may possess more of. For example, a potential acquirer hires investment bank advisors even though they have less internal information, because they can add value on target selection. More importantly, we only require that outside investors possess some information that the manager does not have; they need not be more informed than the manager on an absolute basis. Luo (2005) provides large-sample evidence that an acquisition is more likely to be canceled if the market reacts negatively, particularly in cases where learning is more likely. Relatedly, Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) demonstrate that a …rm's market price a¤ects the likelihood that it becomes a takeover target, which may arise because potential acquirers learn from the market price. More broadly, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) show that the sensitivity of investment to price is higher when the price contains more private information not known to managers.
Our model applies to decision makers other than the manager who aim to maximize …rm value, such as a board or an activist investor: a low stock price may induce them to block a bad investment or …re an underperforming manager. In addition to corporate decision makers, the model can also apply to regulators or policymakers who also a¤ect security values: In late 2011, investors sold Italian bonds due to concerns about Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's handling of the debt crisis. Commentators argue that his resignation on November 16 was due to pressure partly resulting from rising bond yields. 2 After his resignation, bond yields fell from over 7% on November 16 to 6.6% on November 18 and below 6% in early December. This example shows that our e¤ect is not restricted to the prices of corporate assets. Moreover, the applicability of our theory goes beyond …nancial markets to other economic contexts such as prediction markets, which can provide key information to policymakers (Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) ). An important result of our model is an asymmetry between trading on positive and negative information. While the feedback e¤ect reduces a speculator's incentive to trade on bad news, it 1 Our model predicts that speculators refrain from short-selling in expectation of deal cancelation, the direct evidence of which is not empirically detectable. In the above example, speculators who sold might have expected that the acquisition would go through due to managerial private bene…ts. Hence, the example should be used to demonstrate the losses incurred by speculators when a corrective action was unexpectedly adopted in response to their selling. 2 For example, see the news segment "Berlusconi Facing Intensi…ed Pressure to Resign as Italian Bond Rates Continue Climbing" on ForexTV on November 9, 2011, and the Yahoo Finance article "Berlusconi Urged To Quit As Bond Yields Climb" on October 31, 2011. increases her incentive to trade on good news. The intuition is that, when a speculator trades on information, she improves the e¢ ciency of the …rm's decisions, regardless of the direction of her trade. As discussed earlier, selling on negative information reveals to the manager that investment is unpro…table, causing him to invest less. This increases …rm value and reduces the pro…tability of selling. In contrast, buying on positive information reveals that investment is pro…table, persuading the manager to invest more. This also increases …rm value, since expansion is the correct decision upon good investment opportunities, and thus increases the pro…tability of buying. To convey this idea, our model features a …rm that can either increase investment (i.e., invest) or decrease it (i.e., disinvest). We show that in the presence of feedback there is a clear asymmetry in equilibrium outcomes, whereby equilibria in which the speculator trades on good news but not on bad news are much more likely than equilibria in which the speculator trades on bad news but not on good news. Moreover, there is a range of parameter values for which, when feedback is present, the equilibrium is unique and involves the speculator buying on good news and not trading on bad news. This equilibrium does not exist when feedback is not present, i.e. trading in the …nancial market is not su¢ ciently informative to change the manager's investment decision.
Even though the speculator's trading behavior is asymmetric, it is not automatic that the impact on prices will be asymmetric. The market maker is rational and takes into account the fact that the speculator trades less aggressively on negative information, and so he adjusts his pricing function accordingly. Therefore, it may seem that negative information should have the same absolute price impact as positive information: the market maker knows that a moderate order ‡ow can stem from the speculator having negative information but choosing not to trade, and therefore should decrease the price accordingly. We show that asymmetry in trading behavior does translate into asymmetry in price impact. The crux is that the market maker cannot distinguish the case of a speculator who has negative information but chooses to withhold it, from the case in which the speculator is absent (i.e., there is no private information). Thus, a moderate order ‡ow -which is consistent both with the speculator being absent, and with her being negatively informed and choosing not to trade -does not lead to a large stock price decrease, and so negative information has a smaller e¤ect on prices. De…ning "news" as information received by the speculator (i.e. the speculator being present), our model implies that bad news travels slowly: it leads to a smaller short-term price impact and potentially larger long-run drift than good news. A common explanation for this phenomenon is that managers possess value-relevant information and publicize favorable news more readily than unfavorable news, because they wish to boost the stock price (Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) ). In our model, key information is held by a …rm's investors rather than its managers, who "publicize" it not through public news releases, but by trading on it. Investors choose to disseminate bad news less readily than good news due to the feedback e¤ect and its implications for trading pro…ts. 3 In addition to its e¤ects on stock returns, asymmetric trading can also generate important real consequences. Since negative information is less incorporated into prices, it has a lower e¤ect on management decisions. Thus, while positive net present value ("NPV") projects will be encouraged, some negative-NPV projects will not be canceled, leading to overinvestment overall. In contrast to standard overinvestment theories based on the manager having private bene…ts (e.g., Jensen (1986) , Stulz (1990) , Zwiebel (1996) ), here the manager is fully aligned with …rm value and there are no agency problems. The manager wishes to maximize …rm value by learning from prices, but is unable to do so since speculators refrain from revealing negative information. Applied to M&A as well as organic investment, the theory may explain why M&A appear to be "excessive" and a large fraction of acquisitions destroy value (see, e.g., Andrade, Mitchell, and Sta¤ord (2001) ). While intuition would suggest that the market can prevent bad acquisitions by communicating negative information to the manager, our model shows that it may fail to do so due to the feedback e¤ect.
Our paper contributes to the literature exploring the theoretical implications of the feedback e¤ect: see Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) for a survey. To our knowledge, we are the …rst to point out that feedback leads to an asymmetry between buying on good news and selling on bad news. A key ingredient for our result is that the speculator is acting strategically, i.e., she takes into account her impact on the price and the …rm's decision. In reality, the most informed speculators are likely to be large traders (such as hedge funds); indeed, it is their ability to make large trades that incentivizes information acquisition. While strategic behavior and price impact are common in the broader literature on …nancial markets without feedback (e.g. Kyle (1985) ), they are missing from most papers analyzing the implications of feedback for price informativeness. For example, the …nancial market is modeled as a "black box"in Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) as the price simply equals expected value given fundamentals, and there is no account of how speculators incorporate their information into the price via trading. Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2010), Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013), and Bond and Goldstein (2014) feature a continuum of traders who e¤ectively act as price takers.
Another feedback paper that does feature a strategic trader is Goldstein and Guembel (2008) . Their paper analyzes how feedback provides an incentive for an uninformed speculator to manipulate the stock price by short-selling the stock. This reduces the stock price and induces incorrect disinvestment, thus generating a pro…t on the speculator's short position. Their model does not explore the potential asymmetry between the trading on good versus bad news. 4 More recently, Boleslavsky, Kelly, and Taylor (2013) build on our analysis and develop another model where feedback leads to asymmetric trading by a strategic investor. Their paper demonstrates the broader applicability of the mechanism in our paper to the context of policymakers learning from the price to guide a bailout or monetary stimulus, as well as its upon the speculator being present, which is unobservable to a potential trader. 4 The Goldstein and Guembel (2008) framework would not be appropriate to explore this asymmetry, given its other complexities. It needs to track the behavior of uninformed speculators, the core of the manipulation story, and to deal with multiple rounds of trade, which are essential for the manipulation strategy to work. robustness to other modeling approaches.
Finally, our paper contributes to the large literature on limits to arbitrage 5 , which discusses various reasons why speculators do not trade fully on their information. We present a new source of limits to arbitrage, which arise endogenously as part of the arbitrage process -the feedback e¤ect. It stems from the fact that the value of the asset being arbitraged is endogenous to the act of exploiting the arbitrage. Campbell and Kyle (1993) focus on fundamental risk, i.e., the risk that …rm fundamentals will change while the arbitrage strategy is being pursued. In their model, such changes are unrelated to speculators'arbitrage activities. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) study noise trader risk, i.e., the risk that noise trading will increase the degree of mispricing. Noise trading only a¤ects the asset's market price and not its fundamental value, which is again exogenous to the act of arbitrage. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that, even if an arbitrage strategy is sure to converge in the long-run, the possibility that mispricing may widen in the short-term may deter speculators from pursuing it, if they are concerned with short-term redemptions by their own investors. Similarly, Kondor (2009) demonstrates that …nancially-constrained arbitrageurs may stay out of a trade if they believe that it will become more pro…table in the future. Many authors (e.g., Ponti¤ (1996) , Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) , and Mitchell, Pulvino, and Sta¤ord (2002)) focus on the transaction costs and holding costs that arbitrageurs have to incur while pursuing an arbitrage strategy. Others (Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) and Lamont and Thaler (2003) ) discuss the importance of short-sales constraints. While many of these papers emphasize market frictions as the source of limits to arbitrage, the limit to arbitrage we uncover arises precisely when the market performs its utmost e¢ cient role: guiding the allocation of real resources. Thus, while limits to arbitrage based on market frictions tend to attenuate with the development of …nancial markets, the e¤ect identi…ed by this paper may strengthen: as investors become more sophisticated, managers will learn from them to a greater degree. A natural limit to arbitrage featured in Kyle (1985) and the vast subsequent literature is price impact -trades move prices closer to fundamental value, and so speculators reduce their trading volumes to lessen this impact. In contrast, the feedback e¤ect constitutes a limit to arbitrage by moving the fundamental value closer to the price. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains the core analysis, demonstrating the asymmetric limit to arbitrage. Section 4 investigates the extent to which information a¤ects beliefs and prices. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains all proofs not in the main text.
The Model
The model has three dates, t 2 f0; 1; 2g. There is a …rm whose stock is traded in the …nancial market. The …rm's manager needs to take a decision on whether to keep the current level of investment, increase it, or reduce it. The manager's goal is to maximize expected …rm value; since there are no agency problems between the manager and the …rm, we will use these two terms interchangeably. At t = 0, a risk-neutral speculator may be present in the …nancial market. If present, she is informed about the state of nature that determines both the value of the …rm under the current investment level, and also the pro…tability of increasing or decreasing investment. She rationally anticipates the e¤ect of her trading on the manager's investment level. Trading in the …nancial market occurs at t = 1. In addition to the speculator, two other agents participate in the …nancial market: a noise trader whose trades are unrelated to the realization of , and a risk-neutral market maker. The latter collects the orders from the speculator and noise trader, and sets a price at which he executes the orders out of his inventory. This price rationally anticipates the manager's investment decision. At t = 2, the manager takes the decision, which may be a¤ected by the trading in the …nancial market at t = 1. Finally, all uncertainty is resolved and payo¤s are realized. We now describe the …rm's investment problem and the trading process in more detail.
The Firm' s Decision
At t = 2, the manager takes an investment decision denoted by d 2 f 1; 0; 1g, where d = 0 represents maintaining the current level of investment, d = 1 represents increasing investment (which we will often simply refer to as "investment"), and d = 1 represents reducing investment ("disinvestment"). Changing the level of investment in either direction (i.e., choosing d 2 f 1; 1g) costs the …rm c 0.
The value of the …rm, realized at t = 2, is denoted by v ( ; d). It depends on both the manager's action d and the state of nature 2 fH; Lg ("high" and "low"), and is summarized in Table 1 . If the …rm chooses d = 0, it is worth v (H; 0) = R H in state H and v (L; 0) = R L < R H in state L. In state H, the correct action is to increase investment; doing so creates additional value of x > 0 (gross of the cost c < x) and so v (H; 1) = R H +x c. Reducing investment is the incorrect action and reduces …rm value by x, and so v (H; 1) = R H x c. Conversely, in state L, choosing d = 1 creates additional value of x, yielding a value of v (L; 1) = R L + x c; choosing d = 1 costs the …rm x, yielding a value of v (L; 1) = R L x c. We deliberately set the value created by correct investment in state H to equal the value created by correct disinvestment in state L, and to be the negative of the value destroyed by an incorrect investment decision, to avoid baking any asymmetries into the model. Instead, the asymmetric limit to arbitrage will stem entirely from the feedback e¤ect. Note that the above speci…cation implies that:
Inequality (1) is the driving force behind our results. It means that increasing (reducing) investment increases (reduces) the dependence of …rm value on the state. Thus, the speculator's private information on the state is less useful, the lower the investment level taken by the manager. In turn, inequality (1) incorporates two cases, depending on whether …rm value is monotonic in the underlying state:
In this case, state H entails higher …rm value, no matter what action has been taken by the …rm. Hence, disinvestment attenuates, but does not eliminate, the e¤ect of the state on …rm value. For example, state H (L) can represent high (low) demand for the …rm's products. Whether the …rm increases or reduces its level of production, its value will be lower in state L, but the negative e¤ect of low demand is attenuated if the …rm operates at a lower scale. Note that R H x > R L + x is equivalent to R H R L > 2x, i.e. the speculator's private information over assets in place is relatively more important than the manager's investment decision, and thus the feedback e¤ect.
In this case, if disinvestment occurs, …rm value is higher in state L. The investment decision is su¢ ciently powerful to overturn the e¤ect of the state on …rm value. Firm value is non-monotonic in the state: one state does not dominate the other. For example, consider the case where d = 1 implies proceeding with a takeover decision, d = 1 implies selling assets for cash, and d = 0 implies doing nothing. State H corresponds to a state in which current acquisition opportunities dominate future ones, and state L refers to the reverse. If the …rm does nothing or makes an acquisition, its value is higher in state H. In contrast, if the …rm sells assets to raise cash, its value is higher in state L since it can use the cash raised to exploit future acquisition opportunities. Another example is related to Aghion and Stein (2008) : d = 1 corresponds to a growth strategy, and d = 1 corresponds to a strategy focused on current pro…t margins. Growth prospects are good if = H and bad if = L. If the …rm eschews the growth strategy (d = 1), its value is higher in the low state in which there are no growth opportunities. In contrast, in the high state its rivals could pursue the growth opportunities, in turn worsening its competitive position.
Case 1, where a "high" state dominates a "low" state, is the common assumption in the literature and will be the focus of our analyses. We have fully analyzed Case 2, but for brevity do not include it in the paper. Section 3.4 will brie ‡y discuss Case 2 and explain how the fundamental intuition for our asymmetric limit to arbitrage becomes even stronger.
The prior probability that the state is = H is y = 1 2 , which is common knowledge. The manager uses information from trades in the …nancial market to update his prior to form a posterior q, which then guides his investment decision. Let 1 denote the posterior belief that the state is H such that the manager is indi¤erent between investing and doing nothing, i.e.:
which yields
Similarly, let 1 be the posterior belief on state H such that the manager is indi¤erent between disinvesting and doing nothing, i.e.:
For completeness and without loss of generality, if the manager is indi¤erent between doing nothing and changing the investment level, we will assume that he will maintain the status quo. The values of 1 and 1 < 1 represent "cuto¤s"that determine the manager's action. If and only if q > 1 , he will increase investment; if and only if q < 1 , he will reduce investment. For 1 q 1 , he will maintain the current investment level. Since y = 1 2 , the ex-ante net …rm value created by changing investment in either direction is
( x c) = c 0, and so the ex-ante optimal decision is to do nothing. As long as the information in the market does not change the manager's prior much ( 1 q 1 ), he will maintain the current investment level. As we can see from the de…nitions of 1 and 1 , the range of posteriors for which the …rm remains with the status quo is increasing in the adjustment cost c and decreasing in the value created from optimizing investment x.
Trade in the Financial Market
At t = 0, a speculator arrives in the …nancial market with probability , where 0 < < 1. Whether the speculator is present or not is unknown to anyone else. 6 If present, she observes the state of nature with certainty. We will use the term "positively-(negatively-) informed speculator"to describe a speculator who observes = H ( = L). The variable is a measure of market sophistication or the informedness of outside investors, and will generate a number of comparative statics. The speculator has no initial position in the …rm. We have also fully analyzed the case where the speculator has an initial stake, but for brevity did not include this analysis in the paper. Section 3.5 will discuss how the key intuition and results continue to hold under a positive initial stake. Trading in the …nancial market happens at t = 1. Always present is a noise trader, who trades z = 1, 0, or 1 with equal probabilities. If the speculator is present, she makes an endogenous trading choice s 2 f 1; 0; 1g. Trading either 1 or 1 costs the speculator . The trading cost should be interpreted broadly. While direct transaction costs from commissions are typically small, other indirect costs can be large. These include borrowing costs (for short sales) and the opportunity costs of capital commitment (for purchases). These costs may di¤er between buying and selling, but the relative size is a priori unclear. Given our interest in exploring the endogenous asymmetry between buying and selling due to the feedback e¤ect, we assume the same trading cost in both directions to avoid generating any asymmetry mechanically. Unless otherwise speci…ed, we refer to trading pro…ts and losses gross of the cost . If the speculator is indi¤erent between trading and not trading, we assume that she will not trade.
Following Kyle (1985) , orders are submitted simultaneously to a market maker who sets the price and absorbs order ‡ows out of his inventory. The orders are market orders and are not contingent on the price. The competitive market maker sets the price equal to expected asset value, given the information contained in the order ‡ow. The market maker can only observe total order ‡ow X = s + z, but not its individual components s and z. Possible order ‡ows are X 2 f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2g and the pricing function is p (X) = E(vjX). A critical departure from Kyle (1985) is that …rm value here is endogenous, because it depends on the manager's action which is in turn based on information revealed during the trading process.
Speci…cally, the manager observes total order ‡ow X and uses it to form his posterior q, which then guides his investment decision. Allowing the manager to observe order ‡ow X, rather than just the price p, simpli…es the analysis without a¤ecting its economic content. In the equilibria that we analyze, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the price and the order ‡ow in most cases; in the few cases where two order ‡ows correspond to the same price, the manager's decision is the same for both order ‡ows. Under the alternative assumption that the manager observes p, other equilibria can arise, in which the market maker sets a price that is consistent with a di¤erent managerial decision (one that is suboptimal given the information in the order ‡ow) and this becomes self-ful…lling due to the dependence of the manager's decision on the price. Since our interest is in the feedback e¤ect, we focus on equilibria where the manager's decision responds optimally to the information in the order ‡ow.
communicate her information directly to the manager, since it is non-veri…able. Instead, she uses her information to maximize her trading pro…ts (as in the theories of governance through trading/"exit" by Admati and P ‡eiderer (2009), Edmans (2009) , and Edmans and Manso (2011)). The trade-o¤ between using private information to trade or intervene has been studied by Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton (1998).
Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept we use is the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Here, it is de…ned as follows: (i) A trading strategy by the speculator: S : ! f 1; 0; 1g that maximizes her expected …nal payo¤ s(v p) jsj , given the price setting rule, the strategy of the manager, and her information about the realization of . (ii) An investment strategy by the manager D : Q ! f 1; 0; 1g (where Q = f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2g), that maximizes expected …rm value v given the information in the order ‡ow and all other strategies. (iii) A price setting strategy by the market maker p : Q ! R that allows him to break even in expectation, given the information in the order ‡ow and all other strategies. Moreover, (iv) the …rm and the market maker use Bayes' rule to update their beliefs from the orders they observe in the …nancial market, and (v) beliefs on outcomes not observed on the equilibrium path satisfy the Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion. Finally, (vi) all agents have rational expectations in that each player's belief about the other players'strategies is correct in equilibrium.
Feedback E¤ect and Asymmetric Trading
In this section, we characterize the pure-strategy equilibria in our model and demonstrate the asymmetric limits to arbitrage that result from the feedback e¤ect. We focus on Case 1 (R H x > R L + x), where …rm value is monotonic in the state, and brie ‡y discuss Case 2 in Section 3.4.
Overview of equilibria when …rm value is monotonic in states
The equilibrium will depend on whether order ‡ow is su¢ ciently informative to overturn the ex-ante optimal decision of d = 0. Hence, we distinguish between two cases. In the …rst ("feedback") case, 1 2 > 1 . As we will show, 1 2 represents the posterior probability of state H under an order ‡ow of X = 1 in some equilibria. When > 1 , the probability that the speculator is present is high enough that X = 1 is su¢ ciently informative to induce the manager to invest. Thus, there is feedback from the market to real decisions. Since 1 + 1 = 1, > 1 is equivalent to 1 2 < 1 . In some equilibria, 1 2 represents the posterior probability of state H under an order ‡ow of X = 1. When 1 2 < 1 , the posterior is su¢ ciently low to induce the manager to disinvest. In the second ("no feedback") case, there is no feedback e¤ect for these posteriors: the order ‡ow is not su¢ ciently informative to change the manager's decision from the status quo.
As we will show, depending on the values of , four equilibrium outcomes can arise:
1. No Trade Equilibrium N T : the speculator does not trade, 2. Trade Equilibrium T : the speculator buys when she knows that = H and sells when she knows that = L, 3. Partial Trade Equilibrium BN S (Buy -Not Sell): the speculator buys when she knows that = H and does not trade when she knows that = L, 4. Partial Trade Equilibrium SN B (Sell -Not Buy): the speculator does not trade when she knows that = H and sells when she knows that = L.
No feedback equilibrium
Lemma 1 provides the characterization of equilibrium outcomes in the case of no feedback.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium, …rm value is monotone in the state, no feedback). Suppose that R H x > R L + x and
). There exist cuto¤s N F < N T (de…ned in the proof) such that the trading game has the following pure-strategy equilibria:
(a) When < N F , the only pure-strategy equilibrium is T . (b) When N T , the only pure-strategy equilibrium is N T . (c) When N F < N T , the two pure strategy equilibria are BN S and SN B. There is no range of parameter values for which the BN S equilibrium exists and the SN B equilibrium does not exist, or vice versa.
Proof. This proof is incorporated in the proof of Proposition 1.
Two sources of limits to arbitrage are present in the no-feedback case, both of which are standard in the literature, and both of which are symmetric. The …rst source is the trading cost . As increases, we move to equilibria in which speculators trade less on their private information. N T is the threshold for no trading, that is, when N T there is no trading in either direction. Clearly, when speculators are subject to greater transaction costs, they have lower incentives to trade. At the other extreme, when the trading cost is su¢ ciently low ( < N F , where the subscript indexes the "no feedback"regime), the speculator always trades on her private information.
The second source of limits to arbitrage is the price impact that speculators exert when they trade on their information: Knowing that trading might move the price against them, speculators might refrain from trading in some circumstances. In our model, price impact leads to partial trade equilibria in the intermediate region N F < N T . In these equilibria, the speculator trades on one type of information but not the other. While these equilibria are asymmetric -the speculator either buys on good news and does not trade on bad news, or she sells on bad news and does not trade on good news -there is symmetry in that both types of asymmetric equilibria, BN S and SN B, are possible in exactly the same range of parameters.
To understand the intuition behind this pair of asymmetric equilibria, consider the BN S equilibrium (the case of the SN B equilibrium is analogous). In this equilibrium, the market maker believes that the speculator buys on good news and does not trade on bad news. Given that the market maker believes that the speculator buys on good news, a negative order ‡ow is very revealing that the speculator is negatively informed and the price moves sharply to re ‡ect this. Speci…cally, X = 1 is inconsistent with the speculator having positive information, and so the price is only
R L . Thus, the speculator makes little pro…t from selling on bad news; knowing this, she chooses not to trade on bad news. Conversely, given that the market maker believes that the speculator does not sell on bad news, a positive order ‡ow of X = 1 is consistent with the speculator being negatively informed and choosing not to trade. As a result, the market maker sets a relatively low price of
R L , which allows the speculator to make high pro…ts by buying. Thus, the equilibrium is sustainable.
These partial trade equilibria are an interesting feature of our no-feedback case. To our knowledge, they have not been previously discussed in the literature. However, they are driven by the well-known economic force of price impact. In many theories, price impact causes speculators to scale down their trading, and this is manifested in di¤erent ways in di¤erent models. In our model, price impact is manifested in asymmetric partial trade equilibria: The order ‡ow in the direction in which the speculator does not trade becomes particularly informative, leading to a larger price impact which reduces the potential trading pro…ts. Importantly, in the absence of feedback, this force is symmetric: There is no value of in which one partial trade equilibrium exists but the other does not. The same force that deters the speculator from selling in the BN S equilibrium also deters her from buying in the SN B equilibrium, and the two forces are equally strong. Thus, the two equilibria are possible in exactly the same range of parameter values, and there is no range of parameter values for which either equilibrium is unique. In addition, there is no obvious way to select between these two equilibria. Under both BN S and SN B, expected …rm value is
(x c) and the speculator's expected trading pro…t is
(implying the same losses for noise traders). Hence, we cannot rank these equilibria based on the Pareto criterion.
Feedback equilibrium 3.3.1 Characterization of equilibrium outcomes
Proposition 1 provides the characterization of equilibrium outcomes in the case of feedback.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium, …rm value is monotone in the state, feedback). Suppose that R H x > R L + x and
. There exist cuto¤s SN B , N T , and T (de…ned in the proof), where T < SN B and T < N T , such that the trading game has the following pure-strategy equilibria:
(a) When < T , the only pure-strategy equilibrium is T . (b) When N T , the only pure-strategy equilibrium is N T .
is also an equilibrium in the range SN B < N T . There is a strictly positive range of parameter values ( T < min ( SN B ; N T )) for which BN S is the only pure strategy equilibrium. There is no range of parameter values for which the SN B equilibrium exists but the BN S equilibrium does not exist. Equilibrium results are depicted in Figure 1 , which also contrasts them with the equilibrium results in the case of no feedback.
Proof. (This proof also incorporates the proof of Lemma 1 for ease of comparison. More details behind the calculations below are in Appendix A.) Since …rm value is always higher when = H than when = L, it is straightforward to show that the speculator will never buy when she knows that = L and will never sell when she knows that = H. Then, the only possible pure-strategy equilibria are N T , T , BN S, and SN B. Below, we identify the conditions under which each of these equilibria holds. If an order ‡ow of X = 2 (X = 2) is observed o¤ the equilibrium path, we assume that the beliefs of the market maker and the manager are that the speculator knows that the state is L (H). Since speculators always lose if they trade against their information, this is the only belief that is consistent with the intuitive criterion.
No Trade Equilibrium N T : For a given order ‡ow X, the posterior q, the manager's decision d and the price p are given by the following table (see Appendix A for the full calculations):
As shown in Appendix A, the gain to the negatively-informed speculator from deviating to selling is N T 1 3
(R H R L ), and this is also the gain to the positively-informed speculator from deviating to buying. Thus, this equilibrium holds if and only if N T .
Partial Trade Equilibrium BN S:
For a given order ‡ow X, the posterior q, the manager's decision d and the price p are given by the following table:
Calculating the gain to the negatively-informed speculator from deviating to selling and to the positively-informed speculator from deviating to not trading, we can see that this equilibrium holds if and only if
(R H R L ) for the case of feedback and if and only if
(R H R L ) for the case of no feedback.
Partial Trade Equilibrium SN B:
Calculating the gain to the negatively-informed speculator from deviating to not trading and to the positively-informed speculator from deviating to buying, we can see that this equilibrium holds if and only if 
BNS is the unique equilibrium with feedback but co-exists with SNB without feedback. For a given order ‡ow X, the posterior q, the manager's decision d and the price p are given by the following table:
Calculating the gain to the negatively-informed speculator from deviating to not trading and to the positively-informed speculator from deviating to not trading, we can see that this equilibrium holds if and only if < T for the case of feedback and if and only if < N F for the case of no feedback. Figure 1 demonstrates the di¤erence in possible equilibrium outcomes between the case of no feedback discussed in Lemma 1 and the case of feedback discussed in Proposition 1. There are two di¤erences. First, consider the range T < N F . In this range, the unique equilibrium in the case of no feedback is the T equilibrium where the speculator buys on good news and sells on bad news. In the case of feedback, T is no longer an equilibrium in this range of , and the unique equilibrium is the Partial Trade Equilibrium BN S, where the speculator buys on good news, but does not trade on bad news. Hence, for T < N F , the feedback e¤ect generates a limit to arbitrage whereby the speculator refrains from trading on bad news. Second, consider the range N F < min( SN B ; N T ). In this range, the case of no feedback yields two Partial Trade Equilibria BN S and SN B, such that one cannot determine based on any standard criterion which one will be selected. In the case of feedback, SN B is no longer an equilibrium in this range of , and the unique equilibrium is the BN S equilibrium. Hence, for N F < min( SN B ; N T ), the introduction of feedback leads to asymmetric trading in which buying is more common than selling (instead of both Partial Trade Equilibria being equally likely).
Overall, combining the two ranges of parameters, we see that feedback makes the BN S equilibrium strictly more likely and the SN B equilibrium strictly less likely. In one range, the BN S equilibrium replaces the T equilibrium as the unique equilibrium; in the other range the SN B equilibrium disappears leaving the BN S equilibrium as the unique equilibrium. Combining these two ranges together, there is a strictly positive range of parameter values ( T < min ( SN B ; N T )) for which BN S is the only pure strategy equilibrium under feedback, as stated in Proposition 1. In contrast, there is no range of parameter values for which the SN B equilibrium exists but the BN S equilibrium does not exist. This is unlike the no feedback case, where the BN S equilibrium is never unique and always coexists with the SN B equilibrium.
We now explain the intuition behind these results, and in particular why feedback makes the BN S equilibrium more prevalent and the SN B equilibrium less so. We start with the BN S equilibrium. Consider the realization of state L. If the negatively-informed speculator deviates to selling and the noise trader does not trade, we have X = 1, which induces the manager to disinvest in the case of feedback (but not in the case of no feedback). Disinvestment is the optimal decision in state L and improves …rm value. This decision reduces a selling speculator's pro…t in the node of X = 1 from
(R H R L ) (in the case of no feedback) to only 1 2 (R H R L 2x). Hence, while a transaction cost of N F is necessary and su¢ cient to deter the negatively-informed speculator from selling under no feedback, a transaction cost of only T (< N F ) is necessary and su¢ cient to deter selling under feedback, and so the BN S equilibrium becomes more likely in the case of feedback. The di¤erence between N F and T is 2x, the probability of X = 1 ( ) multiplied by the decrease in trading pro…ts in this node under feedback ( 1 2 2x). Due to feedback, the range for the BN S equilibrium is larger: it now becomes sustainable in the range T < N F , whereas only the Trade Equilibrium T was sustainable in this range in the no-feedback case. The feedback e¤ect thus provides an endogenous limit to arbitrage that is distinct from those identi…ed in prior literature -arbitrage is limited because the value of the asset being arbitraged is endogenous to the act of arbitrage.
We now move to the SN B equilibrium. Consider the realization of state H. With 1 2 > 1 , an order ‡ow of X = 1 provides enough positive information to induce the manager to invest, which is the optimal decision in state H. Improving the manager's decision increases the speculator's pro…t in the node of X = 1 for the one share she buys: from 1 2 (R H R L ) (in the case of no feedback) to 1 2 (R H R L + 2x), and so the SN B equilibrium becomes less likely in the case of feedback. While a transaction cost of N F is necessary and su¢ cient to deter the positively-informed speculator from buying under no feedback, a higher transaction cost of 2x, the probability of X = 1 ( ) multiplied by increase in trading pro…ts in this node under feedback ( x. This range is increasing in x, the strength of the feedback e¤ect.
In sum, due to the feedback e¤ect, trading on information in either direction -buying on positive information or selling on negative information -puts information into prices, improving the manager's investment decision and thus …rm value. The feedback e¤ect increases the pro…tability of informed buying relative to informed selling, and thus leads to asymmetric trading.
There is an important nuance in why the feedback e¤ect reduces trading pro…ts. Intuition may suggest that the market maker's pricing function will "undo" the feedback e¤ect: since he is rational, the price he sets for a given order ‡ow takes into account the order ‡ow's e¤ect on the manager's decision. Thus, the price received by the speculator will always re ‡ect the manager's action d, and so it seems that the action should not a¤ect her pro…ts. Such intuition turns out to be incorrect. The source of the speculator's pro…ts is not superior knowledge of the manager's action d, since the market maker can indeed perfectly predict this action from the order ‡ow. The speculator's superior knowledge concerns the state -she directly observes , but the market maker can only imperfectly infer it from the order ‡ow. In turn, the manager's action d (and thus the feedback e¤ect on the manager's action) a¤ects trading pro…ts because it a¤ects the dependence of the …rm value on the state. From (1), …rm value is more sensitive to the state -and thus the speculator makes greater pro…ts from her information on the statethe greater the level of investment. Hence, buying and causing the manager to invest increases the pro…tability of buying, whereas selling and causing the manager to disinvest reduces the pro…tability of selling.
Implications for real e¢ ciency
We now discuss the implications of asymmetric trading for real e¢ ciency. The feedback effect increases real e¢ ciency by providing the manager information to improve his investment decision. However, the limit to arbitrage induced by the feedback e¤ect deters the speculator from trading on her information, reducing price informativeness and thus the net gains from the feedback e¤ect. Suppose the trading cost changes from T " to T + " for an arbitrarily small positive ". The equilibrium, in the case of feedback, will switch from T to BN S, which reduces the e¢ ciency of the investment decision and thus …rm value. Simple calculations show that …rm value is higher in the T equilibrium by 1 3 (x c), which re ‡ects that correct decisions occur more frequently under T due to informed selling by the speculator. 8 Note that …rm values in both equilibria remain higher than if the manager never learns from the market (e.g. because there is no informed speculator, or the manager ignores the information in prices). 9 Hence, the feedback e¤ect directly adds value by informing the manager's decision.
However, the feedback e¤ect also indirectly reduces …rm value by reducing the speculator's incentive to trade on bad news, which lowers the extent to which the market informs the manager's decision. The overall e¤ect of learning from the market on …rm value remains positive.
Equilibrium when …rm value is non-monotonic in states
For completeness, we discuss the nature of the equilibria that arise when …rm value is nonmonotonic in the state, and outline the underlying intuition. 10 Under Case 2 (R H x < R L + x), disinvestment not only mitigates the e¤ect of the low state but is su¢ ciently powerful to overturn it, so that …rm value is higher in the low state than in the high state. As a result, the asymmetric trading result becomes stronger. Now, if the speculator sells on negative information and we have X = 1 so that the manager disinvests, the speculator su¤ers a loss (rather than just a smaller pro…t) even before transaction costs. As in Case 1, both the speculator and market maker will know that disinvestment will occur if X = 1 but have di¤ering views on …rm value conditional on disinvestment. The speculator knows that disinvestment will occur and that = L. Unlike in Case 1, here …rm value is highest under disinvestment when = L. Thus, the speculator's knowledge that = L leads her to assign the highest possible value to the …rm (v = R L + x c), given that it is common knowledge that the …rm will disinvest if X = 1. As 8 The calculation of …rm value in both equilibria is as follows. With probability = H. In the T equilibrium, the manager invests unless X = 0, and so v (H) = R H + 2 3 (x c); in the BN S equilibrium, the manager only invests when X = 2; so v (H) = R H + 1 3 (x c). With probability 1 2 , = L. In the T equilibrium, X 2 f 2; 1; 0g and so the manager correctly disinvests unless X = 0, so v (L) = R L + 2 3 (x c). In the BN S equilibrium, X 2 f 1; 0; 1g and the manager correctly disinvests only if
Regardless of whether = fH; Lg, …rm value is higher in the T equilibrium by 1 3 (x c). 9 In this case, v (H) = R H and v (L) = R L . 10 The full analysis of this case is available upon request.
in Case 1, the market maker does not know that = L and prices the …rm taking into account the possibility that = H. Unlike in Case 1, …rm value is lower when = H, and so the price set by the market maker (
(R L + x) c) is less than the true value of the …rm. Thus, the speculator's pro…t (before transaction costs) is negative (
This result contrasts standard informed trading models where a speculator can never make a loss (before transactions costs) if she trades in the direction of her information. The key to this loss is the feedback e¤ect. As a result, the minimum transaction cost required to deter informed selling in the BN S equilibrium, T 1 3
(R H R L ) , is lower in Case 2 as the …rst term is now negative. Indeed, T may be negative overall, in which case a negatively-informed speculator will not sell even if transactions costs are zero.
The non-monotonicity in Case 2 also introduces a new force: when the feedback e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, the positively-informed speculator may wish to manipulate the price by deviating (from her equilibrium action of buying in BN S or T , or no trade in SN B or N T ) to selling.
11 If she sells when = H, she potentially misleads the manager to believe that = L and disinvest. Since disinvestment is suboptimal when = H, this decision reduces …rm value and so the speculator may pro…t from her short position. Hence, for each of the four equilibria, an additional condition must be satis…ed to rule out manipulation. A su¢ cient condition to prevent manipulation in all four equilibria is R H R L > 4 3
x: the loss from trading against good news (which is proportional to R H R L ) is su¢ ciently high relative to the bene…t from manipulation (which is proportional to x). The same issue does not arise with the negativelyinformed speculator, as she never has an incentive to deviate to buying. If she does so, she misleads the manager to believe that = H and incorrectly invest. This decision reduces …rm value, causing the speculator to incur a loss on her long position. 12 
Discussion of Model Assumptions and Applicability
The above analysis has shown that the feedback e¤ect discourages informed selling relative to informed buying. This section discusses which features of our setting are necessary for this result and which can be relaxed, thus highlighting the conditions under which asymmetric trading likely exists in the real world.
Condition for the feedback e¤ect to exist
Our main result about the increased likelihood of the BN S equilibrium and the decreased likelihood of the SN B equilibrium requires feedback from the …nancial market to real decisions. This in turn arises if …nancial market trading conveys su¢ cient information to in ‡uence the manager's decision. Speci…cally, the asymmetry between the BN S and SN B equilibria in Proposition 1 requires
. These inequalities are more likely to be satis…ed if x is large relative to c -the value created by improving the manager's investment decision is high relative to the cost of doing so -because then the feedback e¤ect is more important. They are also more likely to be satis…ed if , the probability that the speculator is present, is high, so that the order ‡ow is su¢ ciently informative to change managerial decisions. The extent to which the manager will change his decision in response to trading will also depend on additional factors outside the model. If the investment is di¢ cult to reverse (e.g., an M&A deal in which there is a formal merger agreement or a termination fee, or an irreversible physical investment), or the manager is less likely to reverse it due to agency problems (e.g., weak governance allows him to pursue negative-NPV investment to maximize his private bene…ts), the feedback e¤ect will be weaker and so the result on reduced selling relative to buying may not arise.
Hewlett Packard's (HP) acquisition of Compaq illustrates a circumstance under which the feedback e¤ect arises. HP's stock price fell 19% upon announcement on September 4, 2001. That HP's CEO conveyed the unanimous support of its high-pro…le board for the deal contributed to the magnitude of the decline, as traders did not fear that their selling would lead to deal cancellation. To everyone's surprise, Walter Hewlett, who earlier voted in favor of the deal as a board member, announced opposition on behalf of the Hewlett Foundation in the wake of the stock price drop. As chairman of the second-largest shareholder and the son of the company's founder, he posed a credible threat to the deal. Shares of HP rose 17% in response, suggesting that the speculators would not have sold so aggressively had they known that the negative price impact could trigger a corrective action. The combination of rational investor expectation at the time of deal announcement and the expectation being ex post incorrect (due to the unexpected behavior of Walter Hewlett) o¤ers a unique opportunity to observe the feedback e¤ect.
Uncertainty regarding the presence of a speculator ( < 1)
Another important assumption in our model is < 1, so that there is uncertainty on whether there is an informed speculator in the market. To see this, note that the feedback e¤ect only a¤ects pro…ts for the nodes of X = f 1; 1g. If X = f 2; 2g, the speculator is fully revealed and makes zero trading pro…ts; if X = 0, there is no feedback e¤ect as the price is uninformative. Thus, the pro…ts from informed buying equal the pro…ts from informed selling, and again there is no asymmetry. In turn, < 1 is necessary for the speculator not to be fully revealed when X = f 1; 1g and thus for trading pro…ts to be non-zero. For example, consider the market maker's inference from seeing X = 1 in the BN S equilibrium. This order ‡ow is consistent with either the speculator being absent (in which case the state may be H or L), or present and negatively informed. If = 1, the …rst case is ruled out, and so the market maker knows for certain that = L. Thus, X = 1 is fully revealing: the market maker knows both that disinvestment will occur, and that the state is L, and so sets the price exactly equal to the fundamental value of R L + x c. The speculator's pro…ts are zero, and thus automatically una¤ected by the manager's decision and the feedback e¤ect. Indeed, if = 1, then T = SN B and there is no range of parameter values in which there is a BN S equilibrium but no SN B equilibrium.
In contrast, if < 1, the market maker predicts the manager's action but does not know the state. Since X = 1 can be consistent with the speculator being absent and the state being H, the market maker allows for the possibility that = H and sets a price of
Because the speculator knows the state in addition to the action, she makes a pro…t of
The core interpretation of the parameter is the probability that an informed speculator is present in the market. Another interpretation is that the speculator is always present, but can only trade with probability . For example, with probability 1 she receives a liquidity shock that prevents her from trading: buying a share requires capital, and shorting a share requires posting margin. A third possibility is that the speculator is always present and can trade, but is informed only with probability . This alternative scenario, however, requires us to consider the possibility that the uninformed speculator will choose to sell to manipulate the price, as in Goldstein and Guembel (2008) , because doing so may dupe the manager into disinvesting. Since d = 0 is optimal in the absence of information, such manipulation will enable the speculator to pro…t on a short position. To keep the paper focused on its primary contribution, we do not analyze this possibility here.
Zero initial position
The core model assumes that the speculator has a zero initial stake in the …rm. We have fully analyzed the case in which the speculator owns an initial stake of > 0 (i.e. is a blockholder) and show that the key results continue to hold. 13 The fundamental force of the model -the feedback e¤ect increases the pro…tability of buying on positive information relative to selling on negative information -is independent of the speculator's initial stake. Indeed, the range of transactions costs in which BN S is the unique equilibrium with feedback and does not exist without feedback is independent of . Also independent of is the range for which BN S equilibrium exists and the SN B equilibrium does not. It also remains the case that there is no range of for which the SN B equilibrium exists but the BN S equilibrium does not exist.
The intuition for the irrelevance of the initial stake is as follows. A positive initial stake increases a negatively-informed speculator's incentive to sell, because if selling leads to (correct) disinvestment, it increases the value of the speculator's initial stake. However, it also increases the positively-informed speculator's incentive to buy, because if buying leads to (correct) investment, it increases the value of the speculator's initial stake by the same margin. Speci…cally, if a negatively-informed speculator trades 1, she ends up with a …nal position of 1. If a positively-informed speculator trades +1, she ends up with + 1. The incentive to trade on information to increase the value of her initial stake (through the feedback e¤ect) is symmetric across buying and selling, and so cancels out. We are thus left with the di¤erence between trading 1 on negative information and trading +1 on positive information, which is the same as in the core model with = 0. Hence, the asymmetry between buying on good news and selling on bad news remains despite the fact that both trading directions become more attractive when the speculator has an initial position.
Corrective action
In our model, the real decision is a corrective action in that it improves …rm value in the low state. This case arises when the decision maker maximizes …rm value. While we model a manager who attempts to maximize …rm value via an investment decision, other potential applications include a board of directors …ring an underperforming manager in the bad state or an outside investor engaging in activism to restore shareholder value. An alternative real decision is an amplifying action, where the decision maker's objective is something other than …rm value, and maximizing this objective leads him to worsen …rm value in the low state. For example, capital providers may withdraw their investment in the low state, reducing …rm value further (Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013)), or customers or employees could terminate their relationship with a troubled …rm (Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) ). Our model provides distinctive insights on the feedback e¤ect when real decisions are of the corrective nature. In a model with amplifying actions, the speculator will no longer be reluctant to sell on bad news if she has a zero initial stake, since the information will reduce …rm value further, enabling her to pro…t more on her short position.
Other assumptions
Several other assumptions are made only for tractability and can be substantially weakened at the cost of complicating the model with little additional insight. The …rst is that the manager has no signal and the speculator has a perfect signal about the state of nature . We only require that the speculator has some important decision-relevant information that the manager does not have -it is not even necessary that the speculator be more informed than the manager. 14 Another non-critical assumption is discrete trading volumes (i.e., the speculator cannot trade an amount between 0 and 1). The results will likely continue to hold with continuous trading volumes. The speculator may be able to sell a small amount (rather than zero) on negative information without signi…cantly increasing the probability of disinvestment, but she will buy a greater amount upon good information and so the asymmetry remains. Finally, while we assume that there is only one speculator, the results will likely continue to hold in a model with multiple speculators as long as each of them is large enough to have an e¤ect on the total order ‡ow (and hence on the …rm's decision). The key ingredient in our model is that speculators are strategic, which does not require them to be monopolistic.
E¤ect of Information on Beliefs and Prices
The previous section demonstrated that the feedback e¤ect increases the likelihood of the BN S equilibrium, in which a speculator buys on good news and does not trade on bad news: Due to feedback, this equilibrium replaces T as the unique equilibrium in the range T < N F and becomes the unique equilibrium in the range N F < min( SN B ; N T ) (where both BN S and SN B would be equilibria without feedback). In this section, we study the implications of the BN S equilibrium in the case of feedback (
. Section 4.1 calculates the e¤ect of good and bad news about the state on the posterior beliefs q, to study the extent to which information reaches the manager and a¤ects real decisions. Section 4.2 analyzes the impact of news on prices to generate stock return predictions.
Beliefs
Since the manager uses the posterior belief q to guide his investment decision, we can interpret q as measuring the extent to which information reaches the manager and a¤ects his actions. In a world in which no agent observes the state, or in which the manager does not learn from prices or order ‡ows, the posterior q would equal the prior y = . Conversely, in a world of perfect information transmission, q = 1 if = H and q = 0 if = L. Our model, in which information is partially revealed through prices, lies in between these two polar cases. The absolute distance between q and 1 2 measures the extent to which information reaches the manager. Thus far, we have shown that good news received by the speculator has a di¤erent impact on her trades (and thus the total order ‡ow) than bad news. However, it is not obvious that this di¤erence will translate into a di¤erential impact on the manager's beliefs. The manager is rational and takes into account the fact that the speculator does not sell on negative information: Indeed, in the analysis of the BN S equilibrium in the proof of Proposition 1, the manager recognizes that X = 1 could be consistent with a negatively-informed speculator who chooses not to trade, and so q (1) is equal to q (0) (where q (X) denotes the posterior at t = 1 upon observing order ‡ow X). Put di¤erently, although negative information does not cause a negative order ‡ow (on average), it can still have a negative e¤ect on beliefs and be fully conveyed to the manager. Thus, it may still seem possible for good and bad news to be conveyed symmetrically to the manager -by taking into account the speculator's asymmetric trading strategy, he can "undo"the asymmetry. Indeed, we start by showing that, if we do not condition on the presence of the speculator, the e¤ects on beliefs of the high and low states being realized are symmetric. This is a direct consequence of the law of iterated expectations: the expected posterior must equal the prior.
Lemma 2 (Symmetric e¤ect of high and low state on beliefs at t = 1). Consider the BN S equilibrium where and is decreasing in . (iii) We have
: thus, the realization of state H has the same absolute impact on beliefs as the realization of state L.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Of greater interest is to study the e¤ect of the state realization conditional upon the speculator being present. We use the term "good news" to refer to = H being realized and the speculator being present, since in this case there is an agent in the economy who directly receives news on the state; "bad news"is de…ned analogously. While the above analysis studied the e¤ect of the state being realized (regardless of whether the state is learned by any agent in the economy), this analysis studies the impact of the speculator receiving information about the state. The goal is to investigate the extent to which the speculator's good and bad news is conveyed to the manager at t = 1. The results are given in Proposition 2 below: Proposition 2 (Asymmetric e¤ect of good and bad news on beliefs at t = 1). Consider the BN S equilibrium where and is independent of . (ii) If = L and the speculator is present, the expected posterior probability of the high state is q L;spec = and is decreasing in . (iii) We have
which is decreasing in . Since Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 shows that, conditional upon the speculator being present, the impact on beliefs of good news is greater in absolute terms than the impact of bad news, and the asymmetry is monotonically decreasing in the probability of the speculator's presence . Even though the manager takes the speculator's asymmetric trading strategy into account, he cannot distinguish the case of a negatively-informed (and non-trading) speculator from that of an absent speculator (i.e. no information) -both cases lead to the order ‡ow being f 1; 0; 1g with equal probability. Thus, negative information has a smaller e¤ect on his belief. If the speculator is always present ( = 1), the manager has no such inference problem and there is no asymmetry.
In sum, due to the reduced incentive to sell that results from the feedback e¤ect, negative information received by the speculator is transmitted to the manager to a lesser extent than positive information. As a result, the manager cannot use this information to guide his investment decision, with negative real consequences. In particular, even if there is an agent in the economy (the speculator) who knows for certain that disinvestment is optimal, because = L, disinvestment may not occur. The failure to disinvest does not occur because the manager is pursuing private bene…ts, as in the standard theories of Jensen (1986) , Stulz (1990) and Zwiebel (1996) . In contrast, the manager is fully aligned with …rm value and there are no agency problems. The manager wishes to maximize …rm value by learning from prices, but is unable to do so since speculators refrain from impounding their information into prices. Even though he takes into account the fact that the speculator does not trade on negative information when updating his beliefs, he cannot fully undo the asymmetry of her trading behavior.
The above analysis considered the change in the manager's posterior at t = 1. At t = 2, the state is realized and the posterior becomes either 1 (if = H) or 0 (if = L). Since bad news is conveyed to the manager to a lesser extent at t = 1, it seeps out to a greater extent ex post, between t = 1 and t = 2. Thus, bad news causes a greater change in the posterior between t = 1 and t = 2 than good news. This result is stated in Corollary 1 below:
Corollary 1 (Asymmetric e¤ect of high and low state on beliefs at t = 2). Consider the BN S equilibrium where
When the speculator is present, the absolute impact on beliefs between t = 1 and t = 2 of the realization of the state is greater for = L than for = H, i.e. 0 q
The asymmetry is monotonically decreasing in the frequency of the speculator's presence .
Proof. Follows from simple calculations
The smaller e¤ect of bad news on the posterior at t = 1 is counterbalanced by its larger e¤ect at t = 2. As we will show in Section 4.2, surprisingly this result need not hold when we examine the e¤ect of news on prices rather than posteriors.
Stock Returns
We now calculate the impact of the state realization and news on prices, to generate stock return implications. We study short-run stock returns between t = 0 and t = 1, and long-run drift between t = 1 and t = 2. While this analysis is similar to Section 4.1 but studying prices rather than beliefs, we will show that not all the results remain the same.
Short-Run Stock Returns
Lemma 3 is analogous to Lemma 2 and shows that, unconditionally, the good and bad states have the same absolute impact on prices, since the market maker takes the speculator's asymmetric trading strategy into account when devising his pricing function. Let p 0 denote the "ex ante"stock price at t = 0, before the state has been realized.
Lemma 3 (Symmetric e¤ect of high and low state on returns between t = 0 and t = 1). Consider the BN S equilibrium where 
(ii) The stock price impact of the low state being realized is p
We have p
p 0 : the negative e¤ect of the low state equals the positive e¤ect of the high state. Thus, the unconditional expected return is zero. This is an inevitable consequence of market e¢ ciency. The price at t = 0 is an unbiased expectation of the t = 1 expected price in the high state and the t = 1 expected price in the low state. Since both states are equally likely, the absolute e¤ect of the high state must equal that of the low state.
Proposition 3 is analogous to Proposition 2 and shows that, conditional on the speculator being present, good news has a greater e¤ect than bad news:
Proposition 3 states that the average return, conditional on the speculator being present, is positive -i.e., the stock price increase upon positive information exceeds the stock price decrease upon negative information (part (iii)). Put di¤erently, if the speculator receives positive news, this is impounded into prices to a greater degree than if she receives negative news. Since good and bad news are equally likely, this means that the average return, conditional on the speculator being present, is positive (part (iv)). As with Proposition 2, the key to this result is that, even though the market maker is rational, he cannot distinguish the case of a negativelyinformed speculator from that of an absent speculator (i.e., no information). If = 1, equations (4) and (5) become zero and there is no asymmetry; the asymmetry is monotonically decreasing in . Note that the positive average return given in part (iv) is not inconsistent with market e¢ ciency, because it is conditional upon the speculator being present, which is private information. An uninformed investor cannot buy the stock at t = 0 and expect to earn a positive return at t = 1, because she will not know whether the speculator is present. 15 
Long-Run Drift
We now move from short-run returns to calculating the long-run drift of the stock price, to analyze the stock return analog of Corollary 1, i.e., the impact of the state realization on prices between t = 1 and t = 2.
Corollary 2 (Asymmetric e¤ect of good and bad news on returns between t = 1 and t = 2). Consider the BN S equilibrium where 
(ii) If = L and the speculator is present, the average return between t = 1 and t = 2 is
which is negative in Case 1, but can be positive or negative in Case 2.
(iii) If (6) < 0, the di¤erence in the absolute average returns between the speculator learning = H and = L is given by:
which is positive in Case 2 and negative in Case 1. The magnitude of the di¤erence is decreasing in .
(iv) Expected …rm value at t = 2, conditional upon the speculator being present, is:
and the average return between t = 1 and t = 2 if the speculator is present is:
Proof. See Appendix A. Corollary 1 showed that the smaller e¤ect of bad news on beliefs at t = 1 is counterbalanced by a larger e¤ect on beliefs at t = 2, and so the average increase in beliefs in the short-run is reversed by an average decrease in beliefs in the long-run. Corollary 2 shows that this need not be the case for returns: it is possible for bad news to have a smaller e¤ect than good news at both t = 1 and t = 2, and so the speculator's presence can lead to positive average returns in both the short-run and long-run.
In Case 1, we do have the same result for prices as we do for beliefs -the smaller e¤ect of bad news on prices at t = 1 is counterbalanced by a larger e¤ect on prices at t = 2. This is because …rm value is monotonic in the state. Thus, the large fall in the beliefs, that arises when the low state is realized at t = 2, translates into a large fall in the stock price -the low state is bad for …rm value. As a result, prices are too high at t = 1, conditional upon the speculator being present. Miller (1977) similarly shows that prices are too high if bad news is not traded upon. However, in his model, the lack of trading on bad news results from exogenous short-sales constraints; here, the reluctance to short-sell is generated endogenously. Note that the longterm drift in returns does not violate market e¢ ciency. The key to reconciling this result with market e¢ ciency is that …rm value is endogenous to trading. If the speculator sold aggressively upon observing = L, the decline in the stock price would lead to disinvestment occurring. The market is not strong-form e¢ cient in the Fama (1970) sense, since the speculator's private information is not incorporated into prices, but is strong-form e¢ cient in the Jensen (1978) sense as the speculator cannot make pro…ts on her information. Since she does not trade on her information, the negative e¤ect of = L on …rm value must manifest predominantly at t = 2.
In contrast, for Case 2, …rm value is not monotonic in the state. Thus, while beliefs fall signi…cantly at t = 2 when = L is realized, this does not lead to a large fall in the stock price. The initial fall in beliefs at t = 1 may lead to the manager disinvesting, and …rm value under disinvestment is higher when = L than when = H. Thus, the realization of = L at t = 2 becomes good news for the stock price. Thus, bad news leads to a smaller decline in prices at t = 2 as well as t = 1. Put di¤erently, bad news about the state is not necessarily bad news about …rm value, because the manager can take a corrective action that is su¢ ciently powerful to overturn the e¤ect of the state on …rm value.
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the e¤ect of feedback from …nancial markets to corporate decisions on a speculator's incentives to trade on information. Even if a speculator has negative information on economic conditions, she may strategically refrain from trading on it, because doing so conveys her information to the manager. The manager may then optimally disinvest, which improves …rm value but reduces the pro…ts from the speculator's sell order. While the feedback e¤ect reduces the incentive to sell on negative information, it reinforces the incentive to buy on positive information. Doing so induces the manager to optimally increase investment, enhancing …rm value and thus the pro…tability of her buy order.
Overall, the feedback e¤ect causes strategic speculators to trade asymmetrically on information. By deterring them from selling on negative information, it creates a limit to arbitrage that reduces the informativeness of prices. Unlike the limits to arbitrage identi…ed by prior literature, our e¤ect is asymmetric. In addition, it does not rely on exogenous frictions or agency problems, but is instead generated endogenously as part of the arbitrage process. Thus, even if speculators have perfect private information and no wealth constraints or trading restrictions, they may choose not to trade on their information. In addition, our model identi…es the settings in which the feedback e¤ect, and thus asymmetric trading, is most likely to exist in practice. The asymmetry should be stronger if the value created by correct investment decisions is large, or …nancial market trading is more informative. It should be weaker if investment is irreversible (e.g. due to a termination fee or …rm commitment for an M&A deal), or the manager's investment decisions are motivated by private bene…ts rather than …rm value maximization.
Asymmetric trading has implications for both stock returns and real investment. In terms of stock returns, bad news has a smaller e¤ect on short-run prices than good news, even though the market maker is rational and takes the speculator's trading strategy into account when devising his pricing function. Interestingly, in contrast to underreaction models, the smaller short-run reaction to bad news may also coincide with smaller long-run drift, since the manager can disinvest to attenuate the e¤ect of bad economic conditions on …rm value. In terms of real investment, the manager may overinvest in negative-NPV projects, even though there are no agency problems and he is attempting to learn from the market to take the e¢ cient decision. Even though there is an agent in the economy who knows with certainty that the investment is undesirable, and the manager is aware of the speculator's asymmetric trading strategy, this information is not conveyed to the manager and so the desired disinvestment does not occur.
A Proofs Proof of Proposition 1
This proof only provides material supplementary to what is in the main text.
No Trade Equilibrium NT. The order ‡ows of X = 2 and X = 2 are o¤ the equilibrium path and the posteriors are given by 0 and 1, respectively, as these are the only posteriors that satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (as stated in the main proof). The order ‡ows of X 2 f 1; 0; 1g are observed on the equilibrium path and so the posteriors can be calculated by Bayes'rule:
We thus have:
and q (0) and q (1) are calculated in exactly the same way. Sequential rationality leads to the decisions d and prices p as given by the Table in the proof in the main text. We now turn to calculating the speculator's payo¤ under di¤erent trading strategies, which comprises of the value of her …nal stake (of 1, 0, or 1 share), plus (minus) the price received (paid) for any share sold (bought). Under the positively-informed speculator's equilibrium strategy of not trading, we have X 2 f 1; 0; 1g and so her payo¤ is 0. If she deviates to buying:
With probability (w.p.) 1 3 , X = 2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is .
W.p. 2 3 , X 2 f0; 1g, and she pays
Thus, her overall gain from deviation to buying is given by:
A similar calculation shows that, if the negatively-informed speculator sells, her gross gain is also given by (7). Thus, if and only if N T , the no-trade equilibrium is sustainable. The above calculations apply both in the case of feedback ( Partial Trade Equilibrium BNS. The order ‡ow of X = 2 is o¤ the equilibrium path and the posterior is given by 0. The posteriors of the other order ‡ows are given as follows:
Under this equilibrium, the positively-informed speculator buys.
W.p. , X = 2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is .
If the positively-informed speculator deviates from buying to not trading:
W.p. 1, X 2 f 1; 0; 1g, and she doesn't trade in the market. Her payo¤ is 0.
Thus, her overall gain from deviating to not trading is N T (as given by (7)) in the cases of both feedback and no feedback.
The negatively-informed speculator's equilibrium action is not to trade.
W.p. 1, X 2 f 1; 0; 1g, and she doesn't trade in the market. Her payo¤ is 0:
If she deviates to selling:
W.p. 1 3 , X = 2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is .
W.p. , X = 1. In the case of feedback, she receives (R H R L 2x) . In the case of no feedback, she receives
R L per share, and so her payo¤ is R L + (
(R H R L ) .
W.p. , X = 0, and she receives
R L per share. Her payo¤ is R L + (
Thus, her overall gain from deviation to selling is:
in the case of feedback, and
in the case of no feedback. Thus, the BN S equilibrium is sustainable if and only if T < N T in the case of feedback, and N F < N T in the case of no feedback.
Partial Trade Equilibrium SNB. The order ‡ow of X = 2 is o¤ the equilibrium path and the posterior is given by 1. The posteriors of the other order ‡ows are given as follows: Under this equilibrium, the negatively-informed speculator sells.
W.p. 2 3 , X 2 f 1; 0g, and she receives 
If the negatively-informed speculator deviates from selling to not trading:
The positively-informed speculator's equilibrium action is not to trade.
If she deviates to buying:
W.p. , X = 1. In the case of feedback, she pays (R L x) c per share, and so her payo¤ is (R H + x c) (
(R H R L + 2x) . In the case of no feedback, she pays
R L per share, and so her payo¤ is R H (
W.p. 1 3 , X = 0, and she pays
R L per share. Her payo¤ is R H (
in the case of feedback and N F (as given by (9)) in the case of no feedback. Thus, the SN B equilibrium is sustainable if and only if SN B < N T in the case of feedback and N F < N T in the case of no feedback.
Trade Equilibrium T. All order ‡ows are on the equilibrium path and so the posteriors are given as follows: Under this equilibrium, the negatively-informed speculator sells.
W.p. 1 3 , X = 1. In the case of feedback, she receives (R H R L 2x) . In the case of no feedback, she receives
W.p. 1 3 , X = 0, and she receives
If she deviates to not trading:
Thus, her overall gain from deviation to not trading is T (as given by (8)) in the case of feedback, and N F (as given by (9)) in the case of no feedback. A similar calculation shows that, if the positively-informed speculator deviates to not trading, her gross gain is SN B ( SN B > T ) in the case of feedback and N F in the case of no feedback. Thus, the trade equilibrium is sustainable if and only if < T in the case of feedback, and if and only if < N F in the case of no feedback. We now turn to the range of parameter values in which BN S is the only pure strategy equilibrium in the case of feedback. If T < N T , then the conditions for both the N T and T equilibrium to exist are violated. In addition, this is also the range where BN S equilibrium exists. We thus must derive conditions under which the SN B equilibrium does not hold, so that BN S is the unique equilibrium. There are two cases to consider. (i) If SN B N T , the SN B equilibrium never exists, and so T < N T is su¢ cient for BN S to be the unique equilibrium. (ii) If T < SN B N T , the SN B equilibrium exists unless < SN B . Thus, BN S is the unique equilibrium if T < SN B . Combining the two cases gives the range, 
We have: The expected posterior is increasing in : if the speculator is more likely to be present, she is more likely to impound her information into prices by trading.
Moving to part (ii), if = L, we have: 
This quantity is decreasing in . Even though the speculator does not trade upon = L if she is present, her information is still partially incorporated into prices. With = L, there is a 1 3 probability that the order ‡ow is X = 1. This is consistent with the speculator being absent (in which case the state may be either H or L) or her being present and observing = L; it is not consistent with the speculator observing = H. The greater the likelihood that the speculator is present, the greater the likelihood that X = 1 stems from = L, and thus the greater the decrease in the market maker's posterior. Part (iii) follows from simple calculations. 
We have
. If the speculator is more likely to be present, then X = 1 is more likely to result from = L. Thus, the price is higher if and only if …rm value is higher in this state, i.e., R L + x > R H x (Case 2).
The calculations of p 
Proof of Proposition 3
For part (i), if the speculator receives positive information, she will buy one share and so the expected price becomes:
L 1 p 0 < 0.
Parts (iii) and (iv) follow from simple calculations. Dropping constants, both equation (4) (the asymmetry between the price impact of good and bad news) and equation (5) (the average return, conditional on the speculator being present) become:
Di¤erentiating with respect to gives:
